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What is it exactly that gives the objects of our experience their distinctly
determined appearance? How is it that these entities become bounded or obtain identity?
Are the elements of existence determined transcendentally before our perceptual focus
passes over them or do we intervene subjectively on their behalf? Does it really matter to
even ask these questions or can we understand our experience of the world without
knowledge of how it is distinguished?
The purpose of this paper will be to entertain and evaluate these kinds of
questions as they appear throughout the history of the Western philosophical tradition
with hopes of providing a more comprehensive understanding of being and existence.
Particularly, I will discuss the notion of difference or indeterminacy as it appears
problematically in Plato's ontological schema. The consequences of positing absolute
identities will be the focus of this section. In the latter half of the discourse, the focus will
shift to a more contemporary discussion of this term's appearance in reflective human
experience. Ultimately, I hope to give evidence for the claim that identity and difference
have their origins in subjective human reflection. Without an understanding of the
activity of this realm of human experience, the metaphysician and the layperson alike
remain at odds with the apparent determinacy of existence.

Sameness in Difference?

In an attempt to reconcile hndamental dilemmas of his original conception of
absolutes, Plato, in the sophist1, contemplates the possibility of combining these primary
metaphysical building blocks. By doing so, he formulates a foundation consisting of three

findamental elements: being, rest, and motion, and two essential relations: sameness and
otherness. While the rewards of this move seem to fiee Plato fiom Parmenides' logical
dilemma, the metaphysical baggage included gives rise to a completely new set of
problems. With sameness and otherness, Plato describes a manner in which not-being can
be introduced but fails to provide a satisfactory characterization of this new element's
nature. This piece attempts an introduction to the otherness relation, marking the
foundation for hrther inquiry into Plato's late ontological system.
Recognizing the untenable translation tendencies of his original forms to the
perceived world, Plato attempts to account for the change that appears in the realm of
reflections by introducing several foundational absolutes. In doing so, he is well aware of
the dilemma encountered by Parmenides concerning not-being and is challenged to find a
place for this idea in his system. Plato begins his new formulation with the form, being,
,

which participates equally in the forms motion and rest. Remember the original forms did
not have any interaction with themselves or other things. The new notion of participation,
is introduced as a means of representing in absolute form what is experienced in the
reflected world of appearances. Stated otherwise, by introducing the absolutes of rest and
motion, both of which can participate in other absolutes, Plato discovers a manner in
which the forms can represent stable identities that nonetheless provide a source for the
seemingly unstable perceived world. If motion and rest are understood as existing
absolutely by their partaking of being and are allowed to mingle with other forms, then
the rigid realm of the absolutes, once an incoherent source of the reflections of the
perceived world, seems to be transformed into a pliable set of concepts capable of
supplying a foundation for the realm of reflection.

But, there are significant consequences of this move that must be addressed
before the new system of the forms can be accepted as an accurate account of reality.
Again we remember, previously, the forms existed completely separate from one another,
without relation. Now it is not clear, exactly how any entity can be distinguished or
designated without relation to other entities. If the forms existed completely separate
from all other existing entities then it is not clear what distinguishes them either. At the
very least ,an identifiable thing requires a background to be recognized. Whether this
thing exists outside its being perceived existence in relation to the background or other
things seems completely unknowable or indeterminate. Without interaction, at least in
some minimal sense, the notion of identity has no intelligible meaning. With the
introduction of participation among the forms themselves, though, boundaries must be
introduced for these entities.
For this reason, identity is posited in the idea or form of sameness. Now an
absolute itself, sameness participates in being, rest, and motion, thereby determining each
element's individual identity. Being in relation to itself is the same as being rest in
relation to itself is the same as rest; motion in relation to itself is the same as motion.
Likewise, sameness in relation to itself is the same as sameness. The identity of these and
all other subsequent forms (with one paramount exception to be named later) is
determined by each element's participation with sameness. Through sameness and being,
the forms find discrete existence amidst one another that was not even comprehensible
before they were conceived of as interacting.
This illumination brings us to the most significant consequence of the revised
doctrine of the ideas. At the exact instant that a form is conceived of as identical to or the

same as itself, one must admit of its necessary difference to another. Difference or
otherness appears immediately as a mandatory consequence of identifLing individual
forms in the presence of others. Rest, being identical to itself, is other than motion.
Actually, it is only by partaking of difference that rest can affiliate itself with motion at
all. The otherness relation of contraries will be discussed in more detail shortly, but this
example plainly illustrates the appearance of difference as a necessary consequence of the
determination of identity. In fact, all forms participate in otherness in relation to one
another. Even sameness partakes of otherness when compared to other forms. But here is
where the proverbial buck stops. While sameness can participate in otherness by relation
to another absolute, otherness cannot partake likewise of sameness. Here, at the heart of
the revised doctrine of the ideas, Plato confronts the most challenging metaphysical
conundrum of this system head on.
Initially, one offers assent without complaint. Otherness could not partake of
sameness or it would be the same, therefore making it impossible for the forms to relate
to themselves or to be different from one another. More plainly, if otherness were the
same as itself then no difference would be possible. Two distinct forms would not be
different from one another; they would be the same as each other. And one is already
committed to the identity of discrete absolutes with the introduction of participation
among them. Therefore, otherness cannot have identity or partake of sameness. But, what
does this conclusion truly mean? If otherness cannot partake of sameness and procure
identity, then can it be considered a form at all? As Plato describes the revised system it
seems that identity is a crucial characteristic of all absolutes, but it is, at the same instant,
the one element that cannot be ascribed to otherness. How can this apparent

contradiction, the necessity of difference that has no identity, be resolved? We move
away from this crucial dilemma briefly to further describe the peculiar nature of the
otherness relation.
Focusing our attention more broadly once again, we remember that being (and
now all others except otherness) partakes of sameness in relation to itself and of
otherness in relation to others. In the former relation, existence and identity are
confirmed through sameness. In the latter, it appears that non-existence and difference are
affirmed through otherness. But can non-existence exist? It would seem that otherness
circumscribes not-being in a similar manner as sameness circumscribes being. While
sameness provides identity for forms that partake of being (except otherness), otherness,
provides a type of non-identity to those forms that partake of otherness by allowing these
forms to not-be another. By non-identity here, I mean not-the-same-as-where

rest in

relation to itself is the same as rest, rest in relation to being is not-the-same-as being. The
identity of rest is rest; the non-identity of rest is being (or any other form for that matter)
The otherness relationship, necessary for discrete entities in relation, appears to embody
the concept of something not-being another thing. Another example follows.
Rest is the same as or identical to itself by partaking of sameness. Rest is other
than or not identical to motion by partaking of otherness. While identity binds being to
rest in relation to itself, the non identity of otherness binds not-being to rest in relation to
motion. Again, though, how does one describe non identity, not-being . . . . otherness?
We have decided that it must exist, it must partake of being, but we cannot be clear
exactly what identity 3 has. Otherness clearly cannot be described as having being in the

same manner that the other forms do. Perhaps hrther investigation will illuminate the
elusive identity of otherness that we seek.
Returning to the relationship between sameness and the other absolutes, a
heretofore unmentioned characteristic rises to the surface. In the participation of

sameness with these forms, it is noticed that the relation is one-to-one or between only
two entities. In the relationship between being and sameness that gives being identity,
only these two forms interact with one another. There is no mediating element in the
schema. In the difference relation, though, this is not quite the case. Here, otherness is
exactly a mediating element between two distinct identities. Whereas the sameness
relation involves two elements, otherness alwavs involves three. Note this observation in
the previous example. Being stands in relation to sameness as an 'other' only through

otherness. The relation is not just being to otherness or sameness to otherness but being
to sameness through otherness. Three terms are necessar); instead of just two. While this
distinction fails to draw us closer to finding a boundary for otherness, it does provide at
least one intuitive foothold for discovering the hndamental characteristics of this
enigmatic relation.
Unlike this latest general discovery, perhaps an inquiry focused on the specific
kinds of otherness that are found among the forms will hrther illuminate the character of

otherness. Earlier, when outlining the existence of difference, I spoke of the interesting
relation between contraries. Rest and motion share a relation of difference which appears
to be categorically different than that between something like rest and being. In the latter,
the significance of otherness begins and ends with identity. Rest is other than being in no
significant way other than that its identity is different from being. However, in the

difference between rest and motion, another distinction can be made. In addition to being
discrete fiom one another, rest and motion share a difference, characteristic of all
contraries, of absence. Rest is simply the absence of motion and likewise motion is
nothing more than the absence of rest. In this sense, opposites or contraries in the realm
of the absolutes share a dual affiliation with otherness. In the one sense, opposites are
different than one another simply in the determination of their individual identities. But
also, in a more specialized sense, these types of forms relate to one another as the absence
of the other. The differencebetween contraries appears to be identifiablv different than
that between other absolutes. But, what does this resolve in the characterization of
otherness?
It would seem that we have discovered a seam in the non identity of otherness. By
identifying differences in otherness relationships, an unspoken sameness is assumed for
these different types and otherness suddenly appears to have taken up identity. The
otherness of rest and motion has a categorically different identity than that of rest and
other forms. This difference can be observed in other forms that share a contrary. Is this
conclusion absurd? It definitely seems contrary to our initial logical foundations. But,
how could this particular conception of absolutes be otherwise? As otherness occupies
the role of not-being, it assumes counterintuitive characteristics not present in the
remainder of the forms. Through otherness, these individuals obtain the wild card
allowing both distinction and interaction. And as we have discovered, although otherness
cannot possess the particular kind of identity that it afErms in others, 'it' does seem to
show signs of possessing a specialized identity. While hrther investigation is necessary

to confirm the plausibility of otherness in Plato's new formulation, significant progress
has been made concerning the initial ramifications of this term's introduction.
At this point in the inquiry we must move away from Plato's notion of

transcendental absolutes to explore more contemporary theory. We will not discard or
ignore what has been gained by this inquiry, though. Despite the difficulties involved in
holding this view as a complete account of human existence, there are significant lessons
to be learned from the previous exposition. The most important of these is the knowledge
that sameness and difference, hereafter distinguished by the terms determinacy and
indeterminacy, appear to be essentially linked to one another. In the quest for determinate
identity, one inevitably discovers indeterminate difference. Keeping Plato's determinate
absolutes in plain view, we move now to focus on the indeterminate realm of human
reflective experience.

Reflective Resistance

In Experience and Nature, John Dewey acknowledges that although Plato' s forms
in their entirety have been discarded by the philosophic community as a comprehensive
account of existence, nevertheless the basic foundational assumptions of this stance are
maintained problematically in the modern philosophic tradition. The modern thinkers,
beginning with Descartes, drop the notion of these elements (being, rest, motion, etc.) as
absolute ends in themselves but imprudently relocate the determinacy of these elements
within their theories as specific conscious aims, equally separate from the reality which
they give meaning to. "'Final causes' were either wholly denied or relegated to a divine

realm too high for human knowledge. The doctrine of natural ends was displaced by a
doctrine of designs, ends-in-view, conscious aims constructed and entertained in
individual minds independent of nature."2

In a sense, though, Descartes was very close to the conclusions eventually offered
by Dewey when he inquired into the metaphysical certainty of human experience. But his
decision to retreat into the realm of reflective experience, re-entering the realm of
immediate experience only after reason had determined its safety, creates an epistemic
gap between mind and matter that can be reconciled on by means of his deus ex machina.
Descartes' mistake lies in his assigning primacy to the objects of purely psychological
reflective experience, rather than immediate experience itself. Instead of concluding that
reason alone bridges the gap between the mind and the external world, perhaps he should
have eliminated the gap altogether by positing rationality as the interpreter of the
interaction of the senses with the external world. ~ e s c a r t i recognizes
s
the fallibility of
the senses but nevertheless maintains the innate determinacy posited by human
observations of the world. He denies the products of immediate experience as
metaphysically certain but preserves their chief metaphysical conclusion. The result is the
complete divorce of subject and object, mind and matter, into separate entities, which to
this day remain irreconcilably distinct from one another, crippling any serious
philosophic theory emanating from this starting point.
This result is essentially where Dewey begins his critique of Western philosophy.
He states, "the abandoning of acknowledgment of the primacy and ultimacy of gross
experience [allows for] . . . . Mental attitudes, ways of experiencing, [being] treated as selfsufficient and complete in themselves, as that which is primarily given, the sole original

and therefore indubitable data.3 As was stated above, the retreat from sensory experience
of the world as the starting point for reflective inquiry into the nature of existence sets us
as odds with experience even before we begin. Without considering the significance of
this priority, the manner in which something is experienced is given precedence over the
original experience itself. Result: "We get the absurdity of an experiencing which
experiences only itself, states of and processes of consciousness, instead of the things of
nature,"' sabotaging all hopes of understanding our direct experience of the world itself.
For this and other reasons outlined methodically throughout his book, Dewey challenges
contemporary philosophic inquiry to adopt "empirical" methods of inquiry, utilized so
effectively by modern science, to locate primacy in the act of reflecting instead of the
finished product of reflected experience which has already translated immediate
experience for its own varied purposes.5 Only then do we have an opportunity to reveal
that which is determinate (or indeterminate) of existence..
A non-empirical method simply will not do here. Inquiry that begins with the

reflective products of experience as the primary or given inevitably leads to an inexorable
separation of mind and matter. Once this occurs, objects of nature are isolated from the
experience through which they were realized. This reflected experience of natural
phenomena is taken to be complete in itself and the immediate experience is disdainhlly
discarded as secondary. A stated above, 'Experience' is reduced to an experience of itself
instead of the objects of the natural world. This diminished experience casts a yearning
glance back at its ancestor. Like the child's apprehensive gaze, over the shoulder, to his
parents, as the teacher leads him away to his first day of school, reflective experience too,
calls anxiously to the immediate experience which initially gave rise to it, wondering if it

will be reunited with this experience again. For the child, the end of the day will see him
return to his loved ones. For the objects of reflective experience, though, the end of the
non-empirical analysis will result in a permanent separation fiom the experience through
which they were originally conceived. The reflective distinctions will have no way of
eliciting understanding of the natural world exposed by immediate experience.
However, that distinctions of identity and difference are conceived through
reflective experience of the world is in no way disputed here. This characteristic remains
a unique feature of human consciousness. That these identities, or even the elements we
perceive as making up identities, are innate to the actual objects perceived

questioned

here as at the very least epistemically unattainable if not completely false. For every
reflection upon immediate experience requires a choice (conscious or subconscious) that
inevitably includes certain perceptions while discarding many others. By beginning with
reflections as primary, non-empirical inquiry effectively ignores a large portion of the
world offered by immediate experience. How can this analysis hope to offer a
comprehensive account of being when, by design, its sole source of evidence
intentionally abridges its findings before reporting to the authorities? Do not
misunderstand; this selective emphasis of reflection is not in itself a problem for the
carefbl thinker. Instead, it is the denial of this selection that is the problematic feature of
non-empirical inquiry, a problem noted here by Dewey. "Deception comes only when the
presence and operation of choice is concealed, disguised, and denied."6
Therefore, we turn to the type of inquiry that embraces the subjective nature of
reflective experience rather than conceal it. Empirical inquiry, as demonstrated by
modern scientific thought, is such an inquiry. Scientific analysis takes care to note

explicitly the design of its reflections and choices made in the course of its study so as to
signify the place of this experience among others. Taking this step, we have already
brought the objects of reflective experience closer to their origins in the natural world. By
noting the particular method and choices of an individual experience one ascertains the
purposeful interaction between mind and matter that before assured their respective
distinction. Instead of deceptively ascribing objectivity to all experience while neglecting
the bias of particular reflection, this method embraces the subjectivity of experience and
makes its objective claims only after the choices made in the determination of experience
have been accounted for.
Notice, no one method for reflective determination is perceived here as more
primary than another so long as the subjectivities of its activity are accounted for in its
respective conclusions. Materialism and idealism alike offer insighthl conclusions
concerning the nature of human experience but do so only if their particular stances are
observed within the subjective context fiom which they originate. Where is the unity and
objectivity of experience once the mandatory subjectivity of human reflection has taken
its course? This is the empirical question and the results are striking even before
particular analysis is undertaken?
Not only is human reflection rejoined with the objects of immediate experience
but it is also given a future existence as a prophecy of experiences to come. Given this
and that condition, the result will follow. Neglect for the conditions of subjective
reflection, mistaking these experiences for objective truths, prevents non-empirical
thought fiom accurately describing and predicting its proposed objective world-hence
the mysterious gap between mind and matter and the confbsion as to which direction to

search for the solution. Non-empirical inquiry, with its dualisms and presumptive
determinism often creates more problems than it solves. Like an academic puzzle factory,
this method is maintained to ensure the need for philosophers and to produce a steady
supply of unsolvable problems. "For empirical method [ though] the problem is nothing
so impossible of solution. Its problem is to note how and why the whole is distinguished
into subject and object, nature and mental operations."' For greater insight into these
questions, we journey back historically to briefly study consciousness as it develops in
the first reflective humans.
The advent of human consciousness in the biological evolution of our species
marks not only the beginning of rationality but also the inception of metaphysical
distinction. As human beings begin to draw their immediate perceptions of the world
together for the first time into conscious reflective thought, several crucial characteristics
appear. Where previously perception of the world and the course of action that ensued
followed instinctual, subconscious rationality8,the dawn of consciousness brings about
an awareness of the apparent cause and effect relationship of events. Boundaries drawn
before only subconsciously reveal themselves to the newly aware conscious observer.
Events as discrete entities that lead directly to other distinct events appear everywhere in
the newfound 'experience' of these first human thinkers. With this awareness of certain
bounded events as causally connected to other similar events comes the revolutionary
realization that these circumstances could be otherwise, that the situation could be
different. Although this distinction remains purely pragmatic for literally thousands of
years, its realization marks the very beginning of metaphysical reflection and the
uniquely human quest to understand existence.

We note that this early awareness of difference pertains almost completely to very
general events of human experience. For this reason, the recognition that the parts of
these events, the objects of the natural world, are also being bounded with individual
identity largely escapes naive consciousness. But here we must pause to note the
significance of this ignorance, for it will survive indefinitely, well past the arrival of
human philosophical reflection. At this point in human history, unbeknownst to man
himself, subjective reflection makes its first choices in the interpretation of immediate
experience. These choices set a standard for the exposition of sensory information to
become reified over the course of hundreds of generations to follow.
The correct manner, the most usekl for survival, for identifLing the objects of the
external world originally involved constructing the most efficient interpretations of the
immediate experience of this realm, the realm of assumed cause and effect. I stress
assumed here because of the interpretation necessary simply to connect experience in this
way (a caveat far too many thinkers since this earliest reflection have failed to
observe).By the time human consciousness evolves to a point where it can afford to
expend energy reflecting on conscious reflection itself, the notion that many of the
entities of immediate experience are innately determinate (rather than subjectively
determined through conscious reflection) has all but been decided. Two important
dilemmas arise here; 1) human reflection assumes its interpretations of immediate
experience as an awareness of innate or universally stable characteristics of the objects
themselves rather than a highly subjective glimpse of immediate sensory information;
and 2) as a result, the 'events' of early consciousness begin their slow exodus to the
garbage heap of metaphysical constructs.

To their credit, the Greeks attempt to maintain the integrity of human experience
as complete events, the quintessential example being Aristotle's elaborate causal analysis
of experience. But their commitment to the objective identity of the perceived elements
of the world places their inquiry at odds with that of the complete event of human
experience. Unable to reconcile the apparent determinacy of their reflective experience of
the world with the indeterminate elements that remain, these thinkers back themselves
into a narrow corner, the consequences of which reverberate long after this paradigm of
thought is put into practice. This claim is illustrated nowhere more clearly than in Plato's
attempts to identify the universals reflected in the realm of observable entities. As
explicated earlier, the forms beginning with the assumed determinacy perceived by
reflective experience nevertheless require an important element of indeterminacy in order
to account for the apparent instability of the objects of human experience. He finds that
for an object of human reflection to exist and have identity it must also contain an
element of difference or not-being. To be, to exist determinately, a bounded immediate
experience must necessarily not be another. Without acknowledging the subjective
choice involved in the determination of these entities, the thinker remains confbsed as to
how his seemingly determinate object maintains a degree of indeterminacy. I state again
here that reflecting on Plato's forms is not fruitless inquiry. Exhausting the possibilities
of holding out for transcendent absolutes has not marked a regression in philosophic
thought. To the contrary, by means of this study we have a heightened understanding of
the roles of identity and difference and their elusiveness to objective characterization.
One final pass though, perhaps will further convince us that these two ideas appear
everywhere and nowhere in our experience of the world.

In passing, Heidegger makes the following comments concerning the elusiveness
of not being. "It is perfectly true that we cannot talk about nothing, as though it were a
thing like the rain outside or a mountain or any object whatsoever. In principle
nothingness remains inaccessible to s ~ i e n c e . " ~ ~latter
h e remark should be interpreted as
'inaccessible to obser~ation."~
For it is true, difference, one thing not being another,
appears anywhere and everywhere immediate experience is drawn together in
consciousness yet in no instance will one actually observe the object of difference itself.
It is everywhere our gaze turns yet it is nowhere. Otherness remains purely within the

framework of reflective experience.
At the risk of circularity, this notion illuminates a peculiar side of Parmenides'
dilemma. Perhaps, "that it is and that it is not possible for it not to be""

the only

distinction that can be made outside of the realm of reflection. But once human
consciousness, reflective interpretation of immediate experience, is introduced, notbeing1 otherness1 "that it is not" certainly appears to make room for itself. Returning to
our early humans, the characterization "being is" seems to describe quite adequately the
world of pre-conscious man, a being with only immediate experience of the objects of the
world. There is no difference or not being for this creature, no change or becoming. There
is only undifferentiated immediate experience. Only after reflective experience emerges
is there a change in this continuum. But is this circular reasoning? Is it invalid
argumentation to claim that "being is" remains the only possible response for nonreflective consciousness until the individual finally reflects upon his immediate
experience, thereby bounding this experience and implicitly positing the proposition
"being is not"? And does the more important revelation that objects of nature are

subjectively bounded by human consciousness rather than objectively determined
(whether transcendentally or materially) allow us to move away from the theoretical
problems of the Greeks and their western descendents all together? We will continue to
look ahead, searching for the answers to these important questions, keeping an eye out at
all times on that which we have already learned.
After searching within and without human experience, we have focused in on the
possible origins of the identity of our experiences. This identity, often assumed uniquely
determined by the entities of experience itself, nevertheless alludes us when we search for
it there. Instead, this inquiry has found determinate being to be a product of reflective
consciousness' interaction with the objects of the real world. This experience is one in
which identity is determined as a process of reflective choices within a particular set of
immediate experiences. Sameness and difference cannot be experienced outside of this
reflection. Removing these concepts from the particular elements and events to which
they are applied inevitably leads to conhsion in understanding how it is we experience
the world. Furthermore, we can live with this conclusion, the necessary marriage of
determinacy and indeterminacy, so long as we take care to note each element's place in
the reflective composition of individual experience.

' Plato, The Collected Dialogues

2

-

--

Dewey, p 95
ibid., p 15-16
ibid., p 11
While Dewey's notion of "empirical" resembles that of scientific method, there are subtle differences that
become more apparent during the course of his analysis. I will not discuss these particular differences in
this piece, but this should not hinder one's understanding of the gened ideas offered below.
6
ibid., p 29
7
ibid., p 9
Here, I intend a post facto designation of rationality to actions that appear to exhibit the use of reason but
in fact are the product of natural selection in evolutionary fit beings. Reason is followed instinctually
instead of consciously. For a more detailed discussion of this notion, see D e ~ e t tChapter
,
2-Making
Reason Practical.
Heidegger, p 25
lo Although Heidegger repudiates empirical analysis of the world here, I do not believe him to be critiquing
the same empirical inquiry which Dewey requests of the philosophic community. Heidegger seems to reject
the type of analysis focused specifically on physical determinacy of the external world; this is the type of
analysis Dewey would describe as nonempirical materialism.
'l Curd, p 45
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